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COMMENTS
THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DUTY TO ADVISE
AS A SOURCE OF LAW
INTRODUCTION
The work of writing opinions for the various state officials
is probably the most important, though less appreciated from
the standpoint of the work involved, than any of the duties of
the Attorney General’s office. Every opinion is the product of
considerable research and is often as extensive in research as
the preparation of a brief for argument in the Supreme Court.1
—William C. Marland,
Attorney General of West Virginia, 1949–1952

Every state of the United States employs an attorney general,
who fills the role of chief legal officer for the state.2 Unlike the federal attorney general—who is appointed by, and serves at the
pleasure of, the President—the state attorney general is largely an
independently elected position, and the occupant of the office is not
beholden to the will of the governor.3 This independence, coupled
with the multitude of powers of the office, makes it one of the most
powerful political offices in America.4
While the powers and duties of the office vary slightly from state
to state,5 all state attorneys general share a common duty to issue
1. 50 Op. W. Va. Att’y Gen. 185, 189 (1963).
2. See Arlen C. Christenson, The State Attorney General, 1970 WIS. L. REV. 298, 298.
3. See William P. Marshall, Break Up the Presidency? Governors, State Attorneys General, and Lessons from the Divided Executive, 115 YALE L.J. 2446, 2448 (2006).
4. See generally Mark R. Herring, Foreword: The People’s Lawyer: The Role of Attorney
General in the Twenty-First Century, 53 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2018) (discussing the duties
and undertakings of the Virginia Attorney General).
5. Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Constitutional Status and Role of the State Attorney General, 6 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (1993).
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written advisory opinions on matters of law to state officials who
request them.6
This duty to issue advisory opinions—also known as “the duty to
advise”—is among the state attorney general’s most important obligations.7 State officials—most of whom are not lawyers—seek the
guidance of the state attorney general in much the same way that
a traditional client would seek out an attorney to assist with a legal
matter.8 But unlike a traditional attorney-client interaction, this
assistance has far greater import because it functions as a source
of state law by altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of all
persons affected by the opinion—not just the official who requests
it.
The opinions of the state attorneys general function as a source
of law in different ways. The reliance of state administrators on
the advice provided in these opinions has a direct effect on the administration of state government,9 and if the issue is a novel one—
not having yet been addressed by the courts—the attorney general’s opinion “may stand as controlling precedent, and ‘at least
until attacked, [it is an] expression[] of the law.’”10 Thus, while the
attorney general’s duty to advise is “legal in essence” like a traditional attorney-client interaction, it is also “administrative in its
character, and quasi-judicial in effect.”11
Despite the broad importance of the function, scholarship examining the state attorney general’s duty to advise is remarkably
thin.12 This could be due to the fact that state law has generally

6. Henry J. Abraham & Robert R. Benedetti, The State Attorney General: A Friend of
the Court?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 795, 799–800 (1969).
7. See Thomas R. Morris, State Attorneys General as Interpreters of State Constitutions, 17 PUBLIUS 133, 151 (1987).
8. See Emily Myers & Andy Bennett, Opinions, in STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL:
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 74, 74–75 (Emily Myers ed., 3d ed. 2013).
9. See James G. Dickson, Jr., Vital Crucible of the Law: Politics and Procedures of the
Advisory Opinion Function of the Texas Attorney General, 9 HOUS. L. REV. 495, 495–96
(1972).
10. Robert Toepfer, Some Legal Aspects of the Duty of the Attorney General to Advise,
19 U. CIN. L. REV. 201, 202 (1950).
11. Dee Ashley Akers, The Advisory Opinion Function of the Attorney General, 38 KY.
L.J. 561, 571 (1950).
12. See Kevin L. Long, Distinctive Competence: The Role of Virginia Attorney General
Opinions in State and Local Governance 23 (Oct. 2004) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University) (on file with author).
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received less acknowledgment and importance in modern legal education and academia.13 Additionally, when looking for sources of
law, legal academic discourse typically places a heavy emphasis on
statutes and judge-made law, at the cost of examining all other
sources of law.14
This Comment seeks to help fill that gap by considering how a
state attorney general’s duty to advise functions as a source of law,
by proposing six general models of how the opinions of a state attorney general can alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of
persons.15 In doing so, this Comment still seeks to acknowledge
and respect the fact that each state’s individual constitution and
traditions will create a unique role for its attorney general’s duty
to advise in shaping state law.16

13. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 194–97 (2018).
14. See DAVID J. BEDERMAN, CUSTOM AS A SOURCE OF LAW, at ix–x (2010) (“One peculiarity of the modern law school curriculum is that we do not give much reflection now to the
sources of law in contemporary legal culture, and law students reflexively assume that all
law must be derived from a legislature passing statutes or judges deciding cases.”); Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 6, at 796 (“Americans are thought to stand in awe of the law
as explicated by any court, and most particularly by the Supreme Court.”).
15. The federal attorney general’s duty to advise is outside the scope of this Comment.
Unlike the state executive branches where the attorney general is largely an independent
elected official, the federal attorney general reports directly to the President and is accountable to him. See Matheson, supra note 5, at 5. The state power structure has a direct impact
on how state attorneys general carry out their duty to advise, in which they can issue opinions that are at odds with positions taken by state governors. See, e.g., Michael Signer, Constitutional Crisis in the Commonwealth: Resolving the Conflict Between Governors and Attorneys General, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 43, 43–44 (2006).
16. Constitutional issues such as separation of powers and what constitutes “legislative
action” will be explored at length in this Comment. When doing so, this Comment will refer
mainly to ideas expounded on by the Supreme Court of the United States. This is not done
to ignore the rich—and often neglected—history and discourse of state constitutional law.
See G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 1 (1998) (“Legal scholars announce constitutional theories that actually encompass only the federal Constitution—the
rough equivalent of propounding a literary theory that pertains to a single novel.”). Rather,
this Comment uses statements from the Supreme Court of the United States to illustrate
generally accepted constitutional concepts—like separation of powers and exclusive vesting
of legislative power in the legislative branch—that are present in the Federal Constitution,
as well as in state constitutions. See infra Part III. In using the decisions of the Supreme
Court in an illustrative fashion, this Comment is not seeking to promote the idea that state
constitutions should be read to be “co-extensive” with similarly worded provisions in the
Federal Constitution. Under the “co-extension” jurisprudence, state courts look to the rulings of the Supreme Court of the United States as the interpretive authority for similarly
worded provisions in state constitutions. See Stephen R. McCullough, A Vanishing Virginia
Constitution?, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 347, 349–50 (2011). That debate is an extremely interesting one, but one that is beyond the scope of this Comment. For further reading, see Joseph
Blocher, Reverse Incorporation of State Constitutional Law, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 323 (2011);
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Part I of this Comment will explore the history of the attorney
general’s duty to advise, from medieval England through twentieth-century America. Part II will discuss what the modern American state attorney general’s duty to advise looks like today, and
how it may be affected by the increasingly political nature of the
office. Part III will argue that a “source of law” is something that
alters the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons and will explore generally how the opinions of state attorneys general fit into
that framework. Finally, Part IV will propose six distinct models
of how state attorney general opinions alter the legal rights, duties,
and relations of persons and thus function as a source of law. In
doing so, this Comment hopes to bring to light the role that these
opinions play in American state law—a topic that has been far too
neglected in legal academic discourse.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DUTY TO ADVISE
For seven hundred years, attorneys general have been advising
government officials in legal matters.17 The earliest accounts of a
lawyer specifically charged with representing a government date
back to medieval England in 1254, when Laurence de Brok received the appointment to be the “King’s Attorney” and represent
the crown.18 The title of “attorney general” for a lawyer representing the government began to be used in official documentation in
1285.19
Throughout the medieval era, the powers and duties of the attorney general grew.20 By the sixteenth century, the House of

Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 HARV. L. REV.
1147 (1993); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977).
17. Emily Myers, Origin and Development of the Office, in STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL:
POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 8, at 1, 1.
18. Rita W. Cooley, Predecessors of the Federal Attorney-General: The Attorney-General
in England and the American Colonies, 2 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 304, 304–05 (1958).
19. Anton-Hermann Chroust, The Legal Profession During the Middle Ages: The Emergence of the English Lawyer Prior to 1400, 31 NOTRE DAME LAW. 537, 596 (1956). But see
Hugh H.L. Bellot, The Origin of the Attorney-General, 25 L. Q. REV. 400, 403 (1909) (stating
the date of the first use of the term “attorney general” as 1398).
20. See Cooley, supra note 18, at 307.
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Lords was summoning the English attorney general by writs of attendance to consult him on points of law.21 These writs of attendance were the genesis of the modern American state attorney general’s duty to advise.22
When England established colonies in North America in the seventeenth century, each colony set up their own office of attorney
general.23 Richard Lee received the earliest known appointment to
an office of attorney general in North America when he was appointed as Attorney General of the Colony of Virginia in 1643.24
The duties of the colonial attorneys general included prosecuting
criminals, adjudicating disputes regarding shipping, and preparing proclamations of the governor.25
Additionally, just as they did in England, colonial attorneys general gave legal advice and advised colonial government officials.26
Part of this duty included explaining instructions from the English
government regarding colonial affairs.27
Throughout the course of the seventeenth century, it was the
King of England who would appoint a colony’s attorney general.28
Due to this, the colonial attorneys general were, at first, seen as
delegates of the English government.29 As discontent grew with the
government of England, conflicts between the colonial attorneys
general and the colonial governors also grew, and the advice of the
attorneys general was ignored.30 Thus, in the eighteenth century,
it became the governor of the colony who appointed and commissioned the colony’s attorney general.31

21. See W.S. Holdsworth, The Early History of the Attorney and Solicitor General, 13
ILL. L. REV. 602, 602, 606–07 (1919).
22. See Cooley, supra note 18, at 309, 311–12.
23. Sewall Key, The Legal Work of the Federal Government, 25 VA. L. REV. 165, 169
(1938).
24. Lewis W. Morse, Historical Outline and Bibliography of Attorneys General Reports
and Opinions from Their Beginning Through 1936, 30 L. LIBR. J. 39, 226 (1937); Myers,
supra note 17, at 4.
25. PERCY SCOTT FLIPPIN, THE ROYAL GOVERNMENT IN VIRGINIA 1624–1775, at 322–23
(1966).
26. Id. at 322.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 321.
29. See Key, supra note 23, at 169.
30. See id. at 171–73; see also Cooley, supra note 18, at 310–11.
31. See FLIPPIN, supra note 25, at 321.
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After the Revolutionary War, the new states reestablished the
office of attorney general in their new state governments and
clothed the office with additional constitutional and statutory duties and powers to go along with the office’s existing common law
duties and powers—which included the duty to advise governmental officials.32
At the federal level, under the Articles of Confederation, the
Continental Congress submitted a recommendation in 1781 that
an attorney general be appointed—one of the powers of the proposed office being “to give his advice on all such matters as shall
be referred to him by Congress.”33 This proposal was found to be
unnecessary and instead a “procurator” in each state was appointed.34 However, under the Constitution of 1789, one of the first
actions of the First Congress of the new federal government was to
establish the office of a Federal Attorney General of the United
States,35 the first holder of which was Edmund Randolph.36 Though
not spelled out explicitly in statute at the time, the federal attorney
general was also given common law powers—including the duty to
advise federal officials.37
When the southern states seceded to form the Confederate
States of America, they set up an office of the Confederate Attorney
General, which was first occupied by Judah P. Benjamin.38 The
Confederate Attorney General’s duty to advise took on even greater
import for the Confederate government because the Confederacy
lacked a centralized judicial body.39 While the Constitution of the
Confederate States called for the establishment of a Supreme
Court with power like that of the Supreme Court of the United

32. See Myers, supra note 17, at 1; see also Key, supra note 23, at 174 n.34 (citing state
supreme court decisions ruling that the state attorneys general had common law powers
that were not enumerated in state constitutions or statutes).
33. Cooley, supra note 18, at 312 n.28.
34. Id.
35. See Key, supra note 23, at 173.
36. Id. at 175.
37. See United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273, 280 (1888) (holding that the
federal attorney general had common law powers that were not enumerated in the Federal
Constitution or statutes). Today, it is spelled out in statute that the federal attorney general
must give opinions to heads of executive departments. 28 U.S.C. § 512.
38. WILLIAM M. ROBINSON, JR., JUSTICE IN GREY: A HISTORY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM
OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA 33 (Russell & Russell 1968) (1941).
39. Harold L. Sebring, Foreword to THE OPINIONS OF THE CONFEDERATE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL 1861–1865, at v (Rembert W. Patrick ed., 1950).
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States, the Confederate Congress refused to pass the legislation
that would create such a body.40 Thus, the opinions of the Confederate Attorney General were not just a legal authority to be considered regarding Confederate laws, they were the only existing legal authority entitled to consideration on Confederate laws.41
During the time of westward expansion, the federal government
provided an attorney for new territories in their organizing laws.42
Though the office was occasionally abolished within these territories, this was only ever done for short periods of time.43 When these
territories became states, they themselves set the office up in their
new state governments.44
An attorney general’s duty as the chief legal officer of the government to advise government officials can be traced back through
the common law to medieval England. Though it has taken different forms through American history, an attorney general’s duty to
advise has always been present where the office has existed. That
history informs the function and purpose of the duty to advise today.
II. THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DUTY TO ADVISE TODAY
Today, a state attorney general’s duty to advise looks largely the
same as it has throughout American history.45 While it is one of the
common law powers of the office of the attorney general, most
states explicitly list the duty in their state constitutions or statutes.46

40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Act of Mar. 2, 1861, ch. 83, §§ 10–11, 12 Stat. 209, 213 (providing for an
attorney for the newly organized territory of Nevada, to be appointed by the President and
serve a four-year term).
43. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 24, at 45 (stating that, as a territory, Arizona had two
periods of time without an attorney general).
44. See, e.g., id.
45. See Peter E. Heiser, Jr., The Opinion Writing Function of Attorneys General, 18
IDAHO L. REV. 9, 9 (1982).
46. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 22; ALA. CODE § 36-15-19; WASH. REV. CODE
§ 43.10.030(5), (7).
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State attorneys general can be called upon to answer nearly any
question of law that a valid requestor is curious about.47 Different
states have different rules for who can request opinions, but the
general rule is that state legislators and executive officials may request opinions about any legal questions that they may have, and
local officials can request opinions on a more limited and enumerated range of topics.48 All state attorneys general go about the process of issuing opinions in different ways,49 but there are many
overall common characteristics.50
The opinions usually take three different forms.51 First, the attorney general may give his or her advice orally through personal
phone calls or conversations, which are not publicly available.52
Second, the attorney general may issue an “informal opinion,”
which is a letter sent to the requesting official, but is also not available to the general public.53 Oftentimes, these are delegated to an
assistant attorney general with specialized knowledge on the subject and are not sent bearing the attorney general’s signature.54
Third, and most importantly, there are “official opinions,” which
are sent bearing the attorney general’s signature, are available to
the public, and—in many states—are published in a periodic report
of the office of the attorney general.55 It is this third type of opinion
on which this Comment is mainly focused.
State attorneys general will decline to answer certain requests
in certain situations. The most common basis for denying an opinion request is that it will affect ongoing litigation.56 A state attorney general will also deny requests relating to matters that are

47. See, e.g., 1989–1990 Op. Mich. Att’y Gen. 51, 52 (1989) (answering a question relating to bear hunting licenses by stating that “any person who pursues a bear with dogs must
have a valid bear hunting license in his or her possession”).
48. Myers & Bennett, supra note 8, at 74–75, 75 n.4.
49. See generally Dickson, supra note 9, at 495 (giving a detailed explanation of the
office of the Texas Attorney General’s procedure for preparing opinions).
50. See Heiser, supra note 45, at 9.
51. See Robert L. Larson, The Importance and Value of Attorney General Opinions, 41
IOWA L. REV. 351, 353 (1956) (describing the opinions issued by the Iowa Attorney General).
52. Id. at 353–54.
53. See Dickson, supra note 9, at 499–500.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 500.
56. See, e.g., No. 92-204, Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. (1992).
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best reserved for another governmental entity,57 and will usually
refuse to answer any question that is not a matter of law.58
While the state attorney general’s duty to advise has remained
largely the same throughout the course of American history, the
office of the state attorney general has undergone significant
changes recently. The most striking of these has been that the office has become increasingly political.59 In most states, the attorney general is independently elected from the governor, and operates independently as well.60 Nowadays, state attorneys general
are increasingly seen as using their power to advance their own
political careers—not as simply carrying out their duties as the
chief legal officer for the state.61 This increased politicization has a
direct effect on how state attorneys general fulfill their duty to advise state officials, by issuing opinions that are sometimes written
to further their own political and policy preferences.62
The mere fact that state attorneys general use the duty to advance their policy preferences is evidence of the power that their
opinions hold to influence and shape state law. The remainder of
this Comment will explore how state attorney general opinions
function as a source of law.
III. HOW STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS FUNCTION AS A
SOURCE OF LAW
When it comes to the question “What is law?” the legal theorist
H.L.A. Hart has said that “[f]ew questions concerning human soci-

57. See, e.g., 2013 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 267, 268 (2013).
58. See, e.g., 1958 Op. Ind. Att’y Gen. 127, 128 (1958).
59. See Neal Devins & Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Fifty States, Fifty Attorneys General, and Fifty Approaches to the Duty to Defend, 124 YALE L.J. 2100, 2150–51 (2015).
60. Id. at 2124–25. This is in contrast to the federal attorney general, who serves subordinate to the President as part of a unified executive. See Matheson, supra note 5, at 5.
61. See Devins & Prakash, supra note 59, at 2144 (“Attorneys general frequently seek
higher office, so much so that the ‘AG’ label has been described as shorthand for ‘Aspiring
Governor.’”).
62. Id. at 2145 (“Elected attorneys general sometimes use their opinions to assert and
advance their legal policy preferences.”). An illustrative example of this was outgoing Republican Virginia Attorney General Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II, who—in his final days in office—issued two opinions regarding benefits that the Commonwealth and employers were
required to afford same-sex couples. See 2014 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 31, 31–32 (2014); 2014 Op.
Va. Att’y Gen. 59, 60 (2014).
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ety have been asked with such persistence and answered by serious thinkers in so many diverse, strange, and even paradoxical
ways.”63 Indeed, the debate over defining “law” dates back to Ancient Greece, when natural law theorists like Aristotle, Plato, and
Cicero posited that law is the embodiment of universal principles
that emanate from a higher power.64
However, though the endeavor to define “law” has been ongoing
since Ancient Greece, no universally satisfactory definition has
ever been proposed and accepted.65 The never-ending nature of this
quest has driven some of the most eminent legal philosophers—
like the aforementioned H.L.A. Hart—to reject it altogether.66
Other legal theorists, like Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., have
come to a similar conclusion, stating that “[t]he truth is, that the
law is always approaching, and never reaching, consistency. It is
forever adopting new principles from life at one end, and it always
retains old ones from history at the other.”67
It is no surprise, then, that there is a similarly unresolved and
ongoing debate about where law comes from. Legal realists like
Holmes believed that law is the product of traditions and experience accumulated over the course of a nation’s development.68 Others have argued that sources of law are all around us, such as social
norms69 and customs.70
The complexity of defining what law is and where it comes from
has led American courts to largely stay out of it, instead preferring
to be content with the idea that the United States Constitution is
the embodiment of the “supreme Law of the Land.”71 The Supreme
Court did, however, find itself confronted with the related question
of defining what “legislative action” is in the case of Immigration
63. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 1 (3d. ed. 2012).
64. See M.D.A. FREEMAN, LLOYD’S INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 97 (8th ed. 2008);
HOWARD P. KAINZ, NATURAL LAW: AN INTRODUCTION AND RE-EXAMINATION 3–11 (2004).
65. FREEMAN, supra note 64, at 33.
66. See HART, supra note 63, at 16 (“[I]t seems clear . . . that nothing concise enough to
be recognized as a definition could provide a satisfactory answer to” the question of ‘“What
is law?’”).
67. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
68. Id. at 1.
69. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 280 (1991).
70. See BEDERMAN, supra note 14, at 168.
71. E.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI).
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& Naturalization Service v. Chadha.72 In that case, the Court defined “legislative action” as “action that had the purpose and effect
of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons.”73 This
definition—coupled with a recent, seemingly simple, pronouncement of the Court that “the legislative power is the power to make
law”74—gives us a statement that “the power to make law is the
power to take action that alters the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons.” It is within this framework that this Comment
will consider state attorney general opinions as a source of law.
By their own admission, opinions of the state attorney general
do not create new law,75 nor are their interpretations of law binding upon the judicial branch of the state.76 The fact that the determinations of an officer who generally resides in the executive
branch are not binding on the judicial branch is consistent with the
separation of powers principles of state constitutions.77 These separation of powers principles existed in state constitutions even before the Federal Constitution was drafted.78
The fact that the opinions neither create new law nor represent
ultimate statements of “what the law is,” however, does not mean
that they cannot alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons and thus function as a source of law.
Though on its face this claim is an apparent contradiction, one
must consider that the separation of powers is not absolute; rather,
there is a limited degree of interdependence among the operation

72. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
73. Id. at 952.
74. Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018).
75. See, e.g., 1994 Op. S.C. Att’y Gen. 122, 123 (1994) (“This Office [of the South Carolina Attorney General] cannot create law which does not exist.”).
76. See, e.g., 1996 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 194, 195 n.1 (1996) (“Opinions of the Attorney
General, while entitled to due consideration, are not binding on courts and do not operate
as a substitute for a judicial determination.”); see also Morris, supra note 7, at 140 (“State
courts have uniformly held that they are not bound by an attorney general’s opinion.”).
77. See Heiser, supra note 45, at 16. Under these separation of powers principles, it has
long been held that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). This statement
has oft been quoted approvingly by state supreme courts interpreting their own state constitutions. See, e.g., Howell v. McAuliffe, 788 S.E.2d 706, 724 (Va. 2016); League of Educ.
Voters v. State, 295 P.3d 743, 753 (Wash. 2013); Bourgeois v. A.P. Green Indus., 783 So. 2d
1251, 1260 (La. 2001).
78. SUTTON, supra note 13, at 11 (quoting Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L.J. 911, 911 (1993)).
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of the three branches.79 In his famous concurring opinion in The
Steel Seizure Case, Justice Jackson stated that “[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a
workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness
but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity.”80 A government
actor does not violate separation of powers principles unless they
“usurp” the power of another branch by adopting such power fully
as their own.81
State attorney general opinions illustrate this point extremely
effectively. Though they do not come from the legislative branch,
they can still stand as statements of legislative intent.82 Though
they are not judicial pronouncements, they can still stand as “expressions of the law.”83
The criticism of this theory of state attorney general opinions as
a source of law would stem from the fact that, in most states, the
requestor is not bound to follow them,84 and in all states, the judicial branch is not bound to adopt their reasoning.85 This criticism
would fail for three reasons.
First, the Supreme Court of the United States has—since 1858—
consistently and explicitly acknowledged that the opinions of a
state’s attorney general bear serious consideration when deciding

79. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Servs. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)
(“Although [the executive, legislative, and judicial powers are] not ‘hermetically’ sealed,
[they are nonetheless] functionally identifiable [from one another].”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
48 (James Madison) (“[T]he degree of separation [of powers] . . . as essential to a free government, can never in practice be duly maintained.”). This limited interdependence is also
acknowledged across state constitutions as well. See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts
and the Separation of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV.
1417, 1458 (1998).
80. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
81. See, e.g., Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1323 (2016) (holding that Congress may not pass a law that decides ongoing litigation); Clinton v. City of New York, 524
U.S. 417, 446–47 (1998) (holding that a President may not unilaterally change enacted statutes); Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 238 (1993) (holding that the judicial branch may
not involve itself in an issue that the Constitution has wholly assigned to another branch).
82. See infra section IV.B.
83. Toepfer, supra note 10, at 202; see also infra section IV.E.
84. For a discussion of the small handful of states in which the opinions are binding
upon the requestor, see infra section IV.C.
85. See Morris, supra note 7, at 140.
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matters of state law.86 In more recent years, the Court has been
more specific and has stated that federal courts must consider
state attorney general opinions to the same extent as they would
be considered in state courts when deciding a diversity jurisdiction
case under state law.87
Second, the opinions of the state attorney general are rarely
challenged in court.88 Even when they are challenged in court,
state courts are reluctant to overturn them.89 When the opinions
are left unchallenged, they stand as functional expressions of law
because they may be the only existing interpretive authority on the
subject that they are addressing.90
Third, state attorney general opinions often play key roles in directing the administration of state government in matters that, for
various reasons, will never be litigated in state courts.91 Their general effect on the administration of government can also have profound effects on how state government is administered to state citizens.92
These are the multitudes of reasons why state attorney general
opinions should be considered a source of law in general. The next
86. See Union Ins. Co. v. Hoge, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 35, 66 (1859) (“[A]lthough this [opinion
of the New York Attorney General] cannot be admitted as controlling, it is not to be overlooked, and perhaps should be regarded as decisive in a case of doubt, or where the error is
not plain.”); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 617–18 (1973) (“[T]he State’s
Attorney General [issued an opinion on the state statute at issue in the case]. Surely a court
cannot be expected to ignore these authoritative pronouncements in determining the
breadth of a statute.”); Phyle v. Duffy, 334 U.S. 431, 441 (1948) (“The attorney general is
the highest non-judicial legal officer of California, and is particularly charged with the duty
of supervising administration of the criminal laws. His statement on this question is entitled
to great weight in the absence of controlling state statutes and court decisions.”).
87. See Harris Cty. Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 87 n.10 (1975) (citing Jones
v. Williams, 45 S.W.2d 130, 131 (Tex. 1931)) (describing the standard of deference that an
opinion of the Texas Attorney General should receive, as articulated by the Texas Supreme
Court); cf. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 940–41 (2000) (stating that a federal court
cannot consider itself bound by a state attorney general opinion when a state court would
not be bound by such an opinion and that the federal court must give the same level of
consideration to the state attorney general opinion as it would receive in state court); West
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1940) (stating that there are many rules of
decision in state courts that have not been explicitly endorsed by the state’s highest court,
but that federal courts are nonetheless bound to follow them in the same way that a state
court would be when deciding a diversity jurisdiction case).
88. See Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 6, at 803.
89. See id. at 799.
90. See Toepfer, supra note 10, at 201–02.
91. See Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 6, at 799–800.
92. See Long, supra note 12, at 12.
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Part seeks to explore in greater detail how in particular they function as a source of law by proposing six specific ways state attorney
general opinions alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons.
IV. SIX MODELS OF HOW THE STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DUTY
TO ADVISE SHAPES LAW
The power of state attorney general opinions to alter the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons takes six different and distinct forms. As will be explored in this Part, these different powers
result from different traditions and the constitutional and statutory workings of state governments. Not all six of these models are
present in every state, and the models do not look exactly the same
in every state, but together they cover the general ways that state
attorney general opinions function as a source of law.
A. “Entitled to Deference and Due Consideration” in State Courts
The opinions of state attorneys general have the power to alter
the legal rights, duties, and relations of parties before state courts
because even though their conclusions are not binding, state courts
have universally made clear that the opinions bear some consideration when the courts decide cases.93
As discussed supra in Part III of this Comment, state attorney
general opinions are not binding upon state courts. This is consistent with constitutional separation of powers principles as it
would be a usurpation of judicial power for an executive officer like
an attorney general to be able to bind the courts to his or her interpretation of the law.94
On the other hand, state courts have universally stated that
state attorney general opinions should receive some amount of deference and due consideration.95 The terminology for the level of
deference and due consideration varies from state to state.96 As
93. See, e.g., Camara v. Attorney Gen., 941 N.E.2d 1118, 1119 (Mass. 2011).
94. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
95. See Heiser, supra note 45, at 34–35.
96. See, e.g., Carter v. Smith, 366 S.W.3d 414, 419 n.2 (Ky. 2012) (“While not binding
on courts, Opinions of the Attorney General are considered highly persuasive and have been
accorded great weight.”); Dupree v. Hiraga, 219 P.3d 1084, 1110 n.32 (Haw. 2009) (“Attorney
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noted above, the Supreme Court of the United States has stated
that federal courts, when deciding a question of state law, must
give the same amount of deference and due consideration to attorney general opinions as they would receive in state courts.97
However, due to the fact that state courts tend to use ambiguous
and flexible language when describing the amount of deference and
due consideration that attorney general opinions should receive,98
it is difficult to formulate any concrete rules for exactly how state
courts must treat them when making their decisions.99
Some state courts have articulated rules for when the amount of
deference and due consideration accorded to the opinions of the
state attorney general increases. As discussed in the next section,
this is especially true when courts come to see the opinions as indicia of legislative intent due to the fact that the opinion is longstanding or was issued around the time that the statute was
passed.
So, while the level of deference and due consideration afforded
to opinions of the state attorney general by state courts is somewhat ambiguous, it is clear that they do carry some weight in litigation—even though they are not binding on courts and thus not

General’s opinions are highly instructive”); Burris v. White, 901 N.E.2d 895, 899 (Ill. 2009)
(“[A] well-reasoned opinion of the Attorney General is entitled to considerable weight, especially in a matter of first impression in Illinois.”); Bradley v. Iowa Dep’t of Pers., 596 N.W.2d
526, 530 (Iowa 1999) (“[T]he opinion [of the Iowa Attorney General] is entitled to the court’s
respectful consideration.”).
97. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
98. The Supreme Court of New Mexico has issued the bluntest articulation that there
is no standard that it is bound to give attorney general opinions. See First Thrift & Loan
Ass’n v. State ex rel. Robinson, 304 P.2d 582, 588 (N.M. 1956) (“If we think them right, we
follow and approve, and if convinced they are wrong . . . we reject and decline to feel ourselves bound.”).
99. See Heiser, supra note 45, at 35. Though the opinions of the federal attorney general
are beyond the scope of this Comment, it is interesting to note that federal courts are much
clearer about how they treat the opinions of the federal attorney general. Federal courts
give opinions of the federal attorney general Chevron deference, meaning that the court
follows the conclusion of the opinion if Congress has not already spoken to the precise question at issue and if the interpretation is reasonable. See, e.g., Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 642, 646 (1998); see also Sonia Mittal, OLC’s Day in Court: Judicial Deference to the
Office of Legal Counsel, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 211, 217 (2015). Justice Scalia, however,
made the argument—in concurrence—that the opinions should not be given such deference.
See Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 177 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring).
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dispositive—and when they are the subject of litigation, state
courts are reluctant to overturn them.100
Thus, it is clear that the opinions of state attorneys general have
some capacity to alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of parties in litigation—even though the extent to which they have this
power to influence the courts is somewhat ambiguous.
B. Indicia of Legislative Intent
The opinions of the state attorneys general can also alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons when—in the absence
of legislative action—they become indicia of legislative intent.
Courts have stated that state legislatures are “presumed to be
cognizant” of the attorney general’s construction of a statute.101
When a state legislature does not take action following the issuance of an attorney general opinion, state courts see this as evidence of the legislature “acquiescing” to the attorney general’s interpretation.102 Additionally, the older an opinion, the more weight
courts tend to give it because it is presumed that the legislature
has had more time to overturn it if they disagree with it.103
The level of deference afforded to the opinion by state courts is
even higher when the opinion is consistent with past attorney general opinions on a subject that the legislature has not acted upon.104
The inference being drawn by the courts is that the attorney general opinion has become a reflection of legislative intent, because
the legislature is said to have “implicitly approved” of the interpretation when they take no action regarding it.105

100. See Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 6, at 799.
101. E.g., Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 416 P.3d 53, 60 (Cal.
2018).
102. See, e.g., Citizens All. for Prop. Rights Legal Fund v. San Juan Cty., 359 P.3d 753,
758–59 (Wash. 2015) (adopting the conclusions of an attorney general opinion because it
was thirty years old and the state legislature had not amended or clarified the statutory
language since).
103. See, e.g., Minn. Voters All. v. Anoka-Hennepin Sch. Dist., 868 N.W.2d 703, 707 n.2
(Minn. 2015); Cal. Ass’n of Psychology Providers v. Rank, 793 P.2d 2, 10–11 (Cal. 1990).
104. See, e.g., Five Corners Family Farmers v. State, 268 P.3d 892, 899 (Wash. 2011).
105. E.g., Hilton v. N.D. Educ. Ass’n, 655 N.W.2d 60, 65 (N.D. 2002). The concept is similar to the idea of the legislature acquiescing to judicial or administrative interpretations of
statutes through legislative inaction. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpreting
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On its face, the presumption of legislative acquiescence appears
to raise separation of powers concerns about the ability of the state
attorney general—who sits in the executive branch—to define the
intent of the legislative branch. As has already been noted, however, the idea of absolute separation of powers is a fiction, and
there will always be a degree of interdependence among the three
branches of government.106 Additionally, legislative acquiescence
is a presumption and not a set rule, and state courts are never
bound to make a finding of legislative intent based upon a longstanding attorney general opinion.107
However, similar to the regular “deference and due consideration” that is accorded to any attorney general opinion by a state
court, and even though the presumption of legislative acquiescence
to an attorney general opinion is not dispositive, opinions can still
alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons by serving as
evidence of legislative intent regarding a law’s purpose and meaning.
C. Effect Upon the Requestor
State attorney general opinions also alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons through the effect that they have
upon the state officials who request them and subsequently the citizens who are affected by the actions that those state officials take
in response to the advice that they receive.
When a state attorney general issues an opinion, they are acting
in their capacity as chief legal advisor for the state by giving legal
advice to state officials.108 The relationship between the attorney
general and the requestor is that of an attorney and a client, and
the opinions represent legal advice that is customarily followed by
Legislative Inaction, 87 MICH. L. REV. 67 (1988). The concept has its critics though, including the late Justice Scalia who once wrote—in response to the Supreme Court’s decision to
assume that Congress had acquiesced to the interpretations of three district court decisions—that “[m]embers [of Congress] have better uses for their time than poring over District Court opinions.” Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
106. See supra notes 78–80 and accompanying text.
107. Cf., e.g., Galesburg Constr. Co. v. Bd. of Trs., 641 P.2d 745, 750 n.9 (Wyo. 1982)
(stating that attorney general opinions are entitled to even greater weight “when they have
been weathered by time and where the legislature has failed over a long period to make any
change in a statute following its interpretation” but not stating that the court is bound to
adopt the conclusions of the long-standing opinions).
108. Heiser, supra note 45, at 9.
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the state officials.109 This advice ranges from advising local officials
on whether specific local ordinances can be adopted,110 to helping
legislators correct legislative defects,111 to advising whether entire
state statutes are unconstitutional and thus unenforceable.112
The general rule among the states is that the requestor is free
to follow the advice of the opinion if he or she chooses.113 There are
a myriad of reasons for which the requestor should follow the attorney general’s legal advice, such as taking advantage of a wellreasoned analysis or of the legal and political cover that an opinion
can afford for some unpopular course of action.114 The requestor
must also be cognizant of the fact that if they do not follow the
advice and their actions give rise to a lawsuit, the attorney general
will most likely be the one representing them in court.115
A small number of states require that the requestor follow the
advice given by the attorney general in an opinion. For example,
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has stated that “it is the duty of
public officers . . . with notice thereof to follow the opinion of the
Attorney General until relieved of such duty by a court of competent jurisdiction or until this Court should hold otherwise.”116 In
other words, an opinion of the Oklahoma Attorney General is binding upon all state officials affected by it—not just the requestor.117
However, the Supreme Court of Oklahoma has still noted that Oklahoma courts are not bound by the opinions.118
Montana has a similar rule, although the Montana Supreme
Court has held that only “state-employed attorneys” are bound by

109. Id. at 32–33.
110. See, e.g., 2013–2014 Op. Mich. Att’y Gen. 45, 45–46, 51 (2014).
111. See, e.g., 1948–1949 Op. S.C. Att’y Gen. 167, 167–68 (1949).
112. See, e.g., 1985 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. 43, 71–73 (1985).
113. See Myers & Bennett, supra note 8, at 78.
114. See State ex rel. Johnson v. Baker, 21 N.W.2d 355, 372 (N.D. 1946) (“[Attorney General] opinions, if followed in good faith, relieve [the requestor] from responsibility and protect them. If they fail or refuse to follow [the] opinions they do so at their peril.”); see also
Heiser, supra note 45, at 40.
115. See Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 6, at 799.
116. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Bd. of Tax-Roll Corr., 510 P.2d 680, 681 (Okla. 1973).
117. See, e.g., Edwards v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 378 P.3d 54, 60 (Okla. 2015).
118. Id.
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attorney general opinions.119 In contrast, other states, like Delaware, have explicitly rejected such a rule.120
Pennsylvania has a limited version of the rule. By statute, the
requestor—except if they are the governor—must follow the opinion but may seek a declaratory judgment in Commonwealth Court
invalidating the opinion.121 While the declaratory judgment is under advisement, however, the requestor is still bound to follow the
opinion.122
Whether the opinions are binding or not, the attorney general
opinions are “instrumental in controlling the administration of
government.”123 When “there is a need for state government officials to know the duties imposed on them by the law and a need for
the people as a whole to understand the law,” they turn to the state
attorney general to clarify the law and to give direction.124 This, in
turn, affects how government is administered to the general public.125
Thus, whether the requestor is bound to follow the advice or not,
the opinions do not just alter the legal rights, duties, and relations
of the requesting state officials, but also all those who are affected
by the laws that those state officials must administer.
D. Immunity from Liability for the Requestor
In a small number of states, the legal rights, duties, and relations of the requesting state officials can also be altered by state
attorney general opinions by providing a shield from liability for
their actions, if taken in accord with an opinion of the state attorney general.
119. Mont. Immigrant Justice All. v. Bullock, 371 P.3d 430, 438 n.2 (Mont. 2016) (citing
MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-15-501(7)).
120. See Sullivan v. Local Union 1726 of AFSCME, 464 A.2d 899, 901 n.3 (Del. 1983)
(“[A]n opinion of the Attorney General is advisory and not binding on those to whom it is
given.”).
121. See 71 PA. CONS. STAT. § 732-204(a).
122. See id.
123. Toepfer, supra note 10, at 202.
124. Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 6, at 805.
125. Heiser, supra note 45, at 17; see also Long, supra note 12, at 165 (“Virginia Attorney
General Opinions represent an advicegiving device through which the attorney general can
give persuasive advice that administrators, legislators, and judges will hear; and which will
ingrain itself in the laws and policies of the Commonwealth.”).
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For example, in Mississippi, by statute, any “officer, board, commission, department or person” who follows an opinion of the attorney general in good faith is not subject to either civil or criminal
liability for those actions.126
Other states have articulated similar rules. In Nevada, if a government official relies on an attorney general opinion in good faith,
then the official is “not responsible in damages to the governmental
body they serve if the Attorney General is mistaken.”127 In North
Dakota, if a government official relies on an attorney general opinion in good faith, then the official is “relieve[d] . . . from responsibility and protect[ed].”128 In Alabama, if a government official relies on an attorney general opinion in good faith, then the opinion
“serve[s] to offer protection from liability [for the official] to whom
the opinion is directed.”129
Oregon has the same rule, and the Oregon Supreme Court stated
the reason for adopting the rule, saying, “[i]f the law were otherwise few responsible administrative officers would care to assume
the hazards of rendering close decisions in public affairs.”130
Such protection from liability clearly alters the legal rights, duties, and relations of the state officials who receive the protection.
It also alters the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons who
may seek damages against state officials for actions that they take
pursuant to advice contained within an attorney general opinion
that the official requests.131

126. MISS. CODE ANN. § 7-5-25.
127. Cannon v. Taylor, 493 P.2d 1313, 1314 (Nev. 1972).
128. State ex rel. Johnson v. Baker, 21 N.W.2d 355, 372 (N.D. 1946).
129. State Dep’t of Revenue v. Arnold, 909 So. 2d 192, 194 (Ala. 2005) (citing ALA. CODE
§ 36-15-19).
130. State ex rel. Moltzner v. Mott, 97 P.2d 950, 954 (Or. 1940). The Arkansas Supreme
Court has also adopted the rule under a similar rationale. State ex rel. Smith v. Leonard, 95
S.W.2d 86, 88 (Ark. 1936) (stating that if state officials were not shielded from liability when
following the advice of the Attorney General, then “[s]tate officials could not afford to accept
the advice of the Attorney General. They would be compelled to act upon such advice at their
peril. Such is not the law.”).
131. See, e.g., Lee v. Wash. Cty., No. 4:10-CV-16-MPM-DAS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
69272 (N.D. Miss. June 28, 2011) (granting summary judgment to a county board of supervisors in part due to the protection from civil liability afforded to them by following the
advice of an opinion of the Mississippi Attorney General).
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E. Stating the Law and How It Should Be Put into Effect
State attorney general opinions also alter the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons by stating what the law is and pragmatically explaining how laws passed by the legislature should
best be put into effect. This is the “quasi-judicial” role that state
attorney general opinions play.132
In Federalist No. 22, Alexander Hamilton wrote that “[l]aws are
a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation.”133 Hamilton recognized the need for a judicial
department to take legislative acts—which are often cumbersome
and difficult to understand—and apply them to real life situations
and disputes.
The problem with this, though, is that American courts have extremely high barriers to entry. First, and most practically, is cost.
Bringing matters before courts is immensely costly for parties in
terms of time, money, and resources, and those costs often far outweigh the benefits received from adjudication.134 Second, courts
have standing requirements to initiate suit. Since standing is a
constitutional requirement, all states differ slightly in their standing requirements.135 A general rule, however, is that a party must
show an “injury-in-fact” to show standing.136 This is not present
when state officials are seeking advice on what course of action to
take, not action that has already been taken and resulted in an
injury.137
Thus, those seeking guidance when confronted with a statute
that is so convoluted that it is essentially a “dead letter” may be
practically or actually prohibited from accessing the function of

132. Akers, supra note 11, at 571.
133. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 67 (Alexander Hamilton) (Green Neck Publ’g ed., 2017).
134. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, ACCESS TO JUSTICE 79–80 (2004).
135. See James W. Doggett, Note, “Trickle Down” Constitutional Interpretation: Should
Federal Limits on Legislative Conferral of Standing Be Imported into State Constitutional
Law?, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 839, 866 (2008).
136. See id. at 855 n.100. This is particularly important as all but a handful of state
supreme courts have done away with the practice of issuing “advisory opinions,” which are
opinions issued by a single justice in their individual capacity about hypothetical situations
and which do not require standing for issuance. See Charles M. Carberry, Comment, The
State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 81 (1975).
137. See Long, supra note 12, at 179–80.
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courts to “expound and define their true meaning and operation”
of which Hamilton wrote.138
In contrast, state officials who are authorized to request an opinion from the state attorney general do not have to pay to do so, nor
do they have to have any sort of injury-in-fact or standing.139 They
are simply asking a legal question. It also takes significantly less
time to receive an opinion from a state attorney general than it
does to litigate a dispute in court.140 Yet, state attorney general
opinions still functionally stand as “expressions of the law” once
issued.141
Often when issuing an opinion, a state attorney general must
employ the same statutory interpretation techniques as a judge in
the judicial branch would when making a decision. For instance, in
their opinions state attorneys general analyze the plain meaning
of statutes,142 look to legislative history for guidance as to legislative intent,143 and opine on the legislative purpose of a statute.144
They also seek to avoid absurd results in their readings of statutes,145 and employ traditional canons of statutory construction
like the canon against surplusage,146 ejusdem generis,147 and expresio unius.148 The attorney general also applies judicial precedent when issuing an opinion, just as a judge would when making
a decision.149
In short, the state attorney general steps into the shoes of a
judge when issuing opinions. Thus, the attorney general states
what the law is, by adopting judicial rules of decisionmaking and
applying them to situations without having to go through the process of formal adjudication. In doing so, attorneys general still re-

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, supra note 133 (Alexander Hamilton).
See Morris, supra note 7, at 134.
Id.
Toepfer, supra note 10, at 202.
See, e.g., 2002 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 18, 19 (2002).
See, e.g., 80 Op. Wis. Att’y Gen. 264, 272 (1992).
See, e.g., 1982 Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. 364, 367 (1982).
See, e.g., 1998 Op. Nev. Att’y Gen. 118, 121 (1998).
See, e.g., 1995–1996 Op. Mich. Att’y Gen. 116, 117 (1995).
See, e.g., 1982 Op. Ohio Att’y Gen. 2-171, 2-172 (1982).
See, e.g., 1986 Op. Fla. Att’y Gen. 280, 285 (1986).
See, e.g., id.
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spect the constitutional maxim that “[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,”150
because they still respect the fact that the judicial branch has ultimate interpretive authority and is not bound by the conclusions set
forth in their opinions.
There is, however, another duty state attorneys general fulfill
when issuing opinions that the judicial branch does not have,
which is the task of advising the requestor on an appropriate
course of action under an ambiguous statute.
When a requestor comes to a state attorney general for an opinion, often they are seeking advice on what course of action to take,
but when a judge hears a case, it is almost always about a course
of action that has already been taken.151 Thus, how an attorney
general interprets statutes often involves recommending action,
whether due to ambiguous language or lack of language in the statute.152 On the other hand, a judge recommending action to parties
is restricted to opining on what should have been done,153 but a
state attorney general, through an opinion, can “fill[] the policy
gaps caused by lack of clarity in legislation, absence of executive
leadership, and the intermittent, time-consuming processes of conflict resolution in the courts” before a state official takes action that
the courts might determine to be unlawful.154 Attorney general
opinions are also more concerned with solving the requestor’s problem, so they are written in more accessible language, rather than
delving into complex discussions of legal theory—which court opinions often do.155
In sum, the opinions of state attorneys general affect the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons by resolving issues using
the same tools as a judge would—without the costs or barriers of
litigation—and also by using the tools of judicial interpretation to
recommend courses of action to the requestor. This function is both

150. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
151. Cf. Long, supra note 12, at 179–80.
152. See, e.g., 2008 Op. Idaho Att’y Gen. 42, 46–48 (2008) (providing a recommendation
for corrective action as to how open meetings of governmental bodies should be conducted
under an ambiguous statute).
153. See Long, supra note 12, at 186.
154. Dickson, supra note 9, at 495.
155. See Long, supra note 12, at 176.

JORDAN 544 MASTER (DO NOT DELETE)

10/5/2020 8:12 PM

1162

[Vol. 54:1139

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

judicial and administrative in nature and affects not just the requestor, but any persons that will be affected by the action taken
by the requestor.
F. Ensuring State Compliance with Federal Mandates
Similarly, state attorney general opinions alter the legal rights,
duties, and relations of persons by helping state officials understand how to comply with federal mandates.
Under the United States Constitution, the Federal Constitution
and federal laws are “the supreme Law of the Land.”156 This means
that new federal legislation can affect state law, through mechanisms such as preemption,157 and new decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States can also affect state law, such as when
the Court finds a state law to be unconstitutional under the Federal Constitution.158 These new federal laws and new decisions of
the Supreme Court can be quite convoluted and difficult for laymen
to understand.159
State officials—who must understand how federal law has impacted the laws of the state that they are bound by and administer—turn to the state attorney general for guidance on exactly how
state laws have been impacted by new federal law. For example,
there were a multitude of state attorney general opinions issued in
the wake of the passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act160 as state officials struggled to understand how the new
federal health care act impacted existing state health care laws.161
A similar bout of opinions came after the federal government
passed the No Child Left Behind Act162 as state officials sought
guidance on how state education law had been impacted.163

156. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
157. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225–26 (2000).
158. See, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 496 (1965).
159. See, e.g., Jamal Greene, Constitutional Rhetoric, 50 VAL. U. L. REV. 519, 521 (2016).
160. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
161. See, e.g., No. 2014-033, Op. Ohio Att’y Gen. (2014); No. 12-07, Op. N.M. Att’y Gen.
(2012); No. AN2009102500, Op. Alaska Att’y Gen. (2012).
162. Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
163. See, e.g., No. 2005-184, Op. Ark. Att’y Gen. (2005); Letter to Patricia Willoughby,
Op. N.C. Att’y Gen. (2005); No. 04-004, Op. Tenn. Att’y Gen. (2004).
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When issuing opinions regarding new decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States, state attorneys general are not just assisting the state officials in understanding how the law has
changed and how they must respond to it; they are also assisting
the Supreme Court itself by helping to give actual effect to its decisions at the state level. In its opinions, the Supreme Court rarely
gives substantive discussion regarding the enforcement of its decision.164 For high-profile and politically charged decisions, enforcement and compliance is not as automatic as the Court would like
to think it is, but compliance is essential to the effect of the decision.165 Practically, “[i]f the Court announces a policy and no compliant behavior ensues, then there is no decision.”166
Even if state officials are eager to comply with a new decision,
oftentimes they don’t know how to do so. For guidance, they turn
to the state attorney general. For example, when the Supreme
Court issued its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges,167 it did not list
out which state laws were affected by the decision and how. It was
state attorneys general who issued opinions on how the decision
affected their states’ laws.168 The state attorneys general also issued opinions back in the 1960s as to how state schools must respond to the Supreme Court’s decisions in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp169 regarding school prayer,170 and in the
years following Brown v. Board of Education171 regarding school
desegregation.172
Thus, the opinions of state attorneys general affect the legal
rights, duties, and relations of persons by putting federalism into
practice. Where the federal government has not discussed how

164. But see Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 298–301 (1995) (holding
that federal district courts may—and must—enforce the Court’s decision in Brown I that
racial discrimination in public education is unconstitutional).
165. See Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 6, at 796.
166. RICHARD M. JOHNSON, THE DYNAMICS OF COMPLIANCE: SUPREME COURT DECISIONMAKING FROM A NEW PERSPECTIVE 8 (1967).
167. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
168. See, e.g., 2017 Op. Va. Att’y Gen. 212, 217–19 (2017); 100 Op. Md. Att’y Gen. 105,
117–19 (2015); No. 2015-00226, Op. Miss. Att’y Gen. (2015).
169. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
170. See Abraham & Benedetti, supra note 6, at 805–09.
171. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
172. See William N. Thompson, Transmission or Resistance: Opinions of State Attorneys
General and the Impact of the Supreme Court, 9 VAL. U. L. REV. 55, 65–68 (1974).
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states must respond to new federal mandates, state attorneys general provide that guidance through issuing opinions. Without these
opinions, the federal government would have to issue state-bystate guidance itself, or else its exercise of the Supremacy Clause
would have no practical power whatsoever.
CONCLUSION
The state attorney general’s duty to advise has been far too neglected in academic discourse for far too long. In proposing these
six models of how the opinions of state attorneys general affect the
legal rights, duties, and relations of persons, this Comment seeks
to provide a framework to understand how the opinions function
as a source of law. The opinions have a dramatic effect on administration of state government, how state law is given meaning, and
how federalism is put into practice at the state level. These important functions cannot be ignored, and must be considered in order to more fully understand the workings of American state government.
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